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GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Defendant-Appellant Hartford Fire Insurance Company is 
the surety on a labor and material payment bond purchased by Mele 
Construction Co., Inc. ("Mele").  Hartford's bond required 
prospective claimants who were not in a "direct contract" with 
Mele to give written notice of their claims within 90 days after 
they ceased work.  Plaintiffs-appellees, tardy claimants on 
Hartford's bond, are the International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 542 and Michael J. Ragan as administrator of 
various "fringe benefit" funds associated with Local 542 
(collectively, "Local 542"). 
 Local 542 had a collective bargaining agreement with 
Tri-County Excavating, Inc., a corporation owned by the three 
daughters of John Mele, president of Mele.  Hartford rejected 
Local 542's claim, made roughly 120 days after Local 542 ceased 
work, because Local 542 was not in a "direct contract" with Mele 
and so was required to give notice of its claim within 90 days of 
the last labor performed.  Local 542 responded that Tri-County 
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was the corporate "alter ego" of Mele, and that inasmuch as Local 
542 had contracted with Tri-County it had, ipso facto, contracted 
with Mele. 
 Following a bench trial, the district court held that 
Tri-County was indeed the alter ego/instrumentality of Mele and 
entered judgment in favor of Local 542.  The district court held 
that under the terms of the bond Hartford was liable to Local 542 
for Tri-County's unpaid "fringe benefit" contributions, union 
dues, liquidated damages and attorney fees. 
 On appeal, Hartford advances three arguments: first, 
that the district court erred in its alter ego determination 
under Pennsylvania law; second, that the Employees Retirement 
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA"), preempts 
Local 542's state-law action on the bond; and third, that the 
bond does not obligate Hartford to pay liquidated damages and 
attorney fees. 
 We agree with all of the district court's holdings 
except its holding that Hartford was obliged to pay liquidated 
damages and attorney fees.  Consequently, we will affirm the 
district court's award of unpaid fringe benefit contributions and 
union dues.  However, because we conclude that Hartford cannot be 
held liable for attorney fees and liquidated damages, we will 
reverse so much of the district court's orders of March 2, 1994, 
and February 15, 1995, as granted judgment against Hartford for 
those damages.  We will accordingly remand to the district court 
with directions that its judgment against Hartford and in favor 
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of Local 542 on Count IV be modified to delete all awards of 
attorney fees and liquidated damages. 
 
I. 
 Mele purchased the bond ("the Bond") from Hartford to 
cover Mele's wage and labor obligations in connection with earth 
work which Mele was hired to perform on Crown America 
Corporation's Viewmont Mall project in Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania.  Crown is named as obligee on the bond. 
 For the past twenty years Mele, which owns heavy earth 
moving equipment, has sub-contracted with Tri-County on a job-by-
job basis whereby Tri-County provided operating engineers to 
operate Mele's earth moving equipment.  Tri-County is part of a 
group of at least five companies owned by the extended Mele 
family.   
 Under its contracts with with Mele, Tri-County would 
furnish Mele with Tri-County employees who were members of Local 
542.  Tri-County and its employees were subject to the terms of a 
Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), negotiated between Local 
542 and Tri-County in 1988, and a Pension Fund Agreement ("PFA") 
entered into between Local 542 and the General Building 
Contractors Association and the Contractors Association of 
Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware in 1974.   
 When Crown hired Mele for the Viewmont project in the 
Summer of 1990, Mele looked to Tri-County for operating engineers 
and, as it had done in the past, Tri-County engaged members of 
Local 542 pursuant to the CBA and PFA.  As is particularly 
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relevant to the present dispute, the CBA obligated Tri-County to 
make regular "fringe benefit" contributions to Local 542's 
Pension, Health and Welfare, Apprenticeship, Training and Safety, 
Supplemental Unemployment Benefit, and Annuity funds (the 
"Funds") during the time that Local 542 members were in Tri-
County's employ.  The CBA also required Tri-County to pay 
"supplemental union dues" and provided for the payment of a 
specific monetary penalty should Tri-County become delinquent in 
its fringe benefit contributions.  The PFA provided that in the 
event of a lawsuit against an employer to collect unpaid 
contributions, the employer was obliged to pay costs and 
reasonable attorney fees.  
 Work on the Viewmont project commenced some time in 
August of 1990, and Tri-County began making the required fringe 
benefit contributions to the Funds as required by the CBA. 
 The Viewmont project foundered in the spring of 1991, 
with disastrous results:  Crown stopped paying Mele, Mele fell 
behind in progress payments to Tri-County, and Tri-County in turn 
failed to make the fringe benefit contributions to the Funds for 
the period March-June, 1991.  Within months, Mele had filed for 
bankruptcy and Tri-County became insolvent.  By this time the 
Funds were owed roughly $78,000.00 in unpaid contributions. 
 On or about November 1, 1991, Local 542, having been 
informed by Tri-County that it was unable to satisfy its 
obligations to the Funds, turned to Hartford for payment. 
 Hartford's Bond contained the following provision: 
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No suit or action shall be commenced 
hereunder by any claimant, (a) unless 
claimant, other than one having a direct 
contract with the principal, shall have given 
written notice to any two of the following: 
the principal, the owner or the surety. . ., 
within ninety days after such claimant did or 
performed the last of the work or labor . . . 
for which said claim is made. 
App. 97 (emphasis added). 
 Under this provision, all claimants who had not 
contracted directly with Mele were required to give written 
notice to any two of Mele, Hartford or Crown within 90 days after 
ceasing work. 
 As shown by Tri-County records, the "last labor" 
provided by Local 542 on the Viewmont job was for the week ending 
June 28, 1991.  Local 542 did not give notice of its claim until 
on or about November 1, 1991, more than 120 days after "last 
labor" was performed.   Hartford rejected Local 542's request on 
the ground that Local 542 had failed to make timely notice of its 
claim. 
 On January 3, 1992, Local 542 commenced this action in 
the federal district court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity of citizenship, seeking 
delinquent fringe benefit contributions, union dues, liquidated 
damages and attorney fees.0  Local 542 claimed that Tri-County 
                                                           
0Also named as defendants in Local 542's complaint were Tri-
County (Counts I and II) and United States Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company ("USF&G"), another surety for Mele on a different 
construction project (Count III).  Tri-County did not defend 
itself below, and a default judgment was entered against Tri-
County in the district court.  Tri-County has not appealed.    
 Sometime following the commencement of this action 
Local 542 and USF&G entered into a settlement agreement and Local 
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was Mele's alter ego, and that Local 542 was therefore in a 
"direct contract" with Mele and so was not subject to the bond's 
90 day notice provision. 
 The district court agreed with Local 542.  Following a 
bench trial, the district court, by order dated March 2, 1994, 
entered judgment against Hartford and awarded Local 542 
$78,794.79 in unpaid fringe benefit contributions, $5,719.11 in 
unpaid union dues, and $42,190.21 in liquidated damages, less 
$480.00 in prepayment.  The district court also awarded 
reasonable attorney fees to Local 542, but did not quantify those 
fees until it entered its order of February 15, 1995, which set 
attorney fees at $19,881.73. 
 Hartford appealed from the district court's March 2, 
1994 order on March 29, 1994, and timely appealed the February 
15, 1995 order.0 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 As noted above, the district court's March 2, 1994 
order entered judgment in favor of Local 542 and among other 
things awarded reasonable attorney fees but did not quantify the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
542 dismissed its action against USF&G pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1).  Accordingly, the instant appeal 
concerns only Count IV of the Complaint, naming Hartford as 
defendant. 
0After the district court entered its order quantifying attorney 
fees, Hartford filed another appeal at docket no. 95-1189 which 
challenged the award itself, but did not contest the amount of 
fees awarded.  That appeal was limited to "the issue of the 
Benefit Funds' entitlement to attorney fees as previously briefed 
and argued," (Stipulation of Counsel for Consolidation of 
Appeals, ¶ 9), and has been consolidated with the present appeal. 
Both parties agreed that the issue raised in 95-1189 with respect 
to attorney fees is identical to the attorney fees issue raised 
in the earlier appeal at 94-1388. 
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amount of those fees.  Although Hartford appealed the March 2, 
1994 order on March 29, 1994, it was not until February 15, 1995 
that the district court entered an order setting attorney fees at 
$19,881.73.  Neither party questioned the jurisdiction of this 
court to hear Hartford's appeal.  However, we must consider our 
appellate jurisdiction as a threshold matter.  See Trent Realty 
Associates v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Philadelphia, 657 
F.2d 29, 36 (3d Cir. 1981) ("A federal court is bound to consider 
its own jurisdiction preliminary to consideration of the 
merits."). 
 The district court's award of attorney fees was 
premised on a provision in the Pension Fund Agreement between 
Local 542 and Tri-County which provides that in the event of a 
lawsuit to collect delinquent contributions the employer "shall 
pay all costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred."  App. 
133. 
 In Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 815 
F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1987), we held that when an award of attorney 
fees is based on a contractual provision and is an "integral part 
of the contractual relief sought," the order does not become 
final and appealable until the attorney fees are quantified.  Id. 
at 287.  Accord Vargas v. Hudson County Bd. of Elections, 949 
F.2d 665, 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (where attorney fees are sought as 
part of damages, and not as prevailing party, the rule of 
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988), does 
not apply and the district court's ruling is not final until the 
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amount of fees is fixed); accord SPM Corp. v. M/V Ming Moon, 965 
F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 Because the attorney fees awarded in this case were 
part of the contractual damages sought by Local 542, the district 
court's delay in quantifying the amount of such fees until 
February 15, 1995 rendered the earlier order non-final for 
purposes of appeal.    
 This defect was not fatal to Hartford's appeal, 
however.  Even though the March 2, 1994 order was not final when 
entered, it became final upon entry of the February 15, 1995 
order fixing attorney fees and expenses at $19,881.73.  We 
therefore exercise our jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and the principle expressed in Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 
698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983), that this Court may 
entertain an appeal from a nonfinal order if an order which is 
final is subsequently entered before our adjudication on the 
merits. 
 
III.  Alter Ego 
 Hartford argues on appeal that the district court's 
alter ego determination is infected by clearly erroneous 
underlying factual findings, and that in any event the district 
court misapplied Pennsylvania law to the facts as found. 
 When considering a district court's state law alter ego 
determinations, we review the court's factual findings for clear 
error, but exercise plenary review over the legal conclusions it 
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draws from those facts.  Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 
843 F.2d 145, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
A. 
 After receiving evidence and taking testimony from 
Local 542 members Stanley Stracham and Edward Gilette, Tri-
County's president Angela Scarantino, Hartford bond underwriter 
John Johnson and claims supervisor Dennis Powers, and Michael 
Ragan, administrator of the Funds, the district court found the 
following facts:   
 Tri-County has always maintained appropriate corporate 
formalities.  Both Mele and Tri-County are duly authorized 
Pennsylvania corporations.  Each filed articles of incorporation, 
held regular corporate meetings, kept their own corporate 
records, and took care not to intermingle funds.   
 Tri-County is owned by the three daughters of John 
Mele, Mele's president and majority shareholder.  The three Mele 
daughters, Angela Scarantino, Beverly Occulto, and Karen 
Darbenzio, each also own 11% of the shares of Mele.  The 
remainder of the stockholdings in Mele is in the name of John 
Mele (53%) and his wife, Catherine (14%).  The Mele corporation 
has filed in bankruptcy.  Angela Scarantino is the president of 
Tri-County, and Karen Darbenzio was an officer and shareholder of 
both Mele and Tri-County. 
 In addition to Tri-County, there are at least four 
other family-owned corporations in the Mele "group": Eleven-7 
Corporation, owned by Stephen Scarantino and Bert Occulto, 
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husbands of Angela and Beverly, respectively; John Sal Inc., also 
owned by the three Mele daughters; Melback Corp., of which John 
Mele is the president, and West Mountain Sand Stone & Aggregates, 
Inc., of which Bert Occulto is the president.   
 Tri-County, which operates from a trailer leased from 
Eleven-7 corporation on land owned by John Sal, Inc., owned no 
equipment of its own.  For the past twenty years, its sole 
function has been to supply operating engineers to Mele.  Tri-
County has undertaken no projects since Mele's demise.   
 Tri-County has never paid a dividend and was grossly 
undercapitalized for the work it had contracted to perform.  As a 
result, it became insolvent shortly after Mele stopped payments 
on the Viewmont job. 
 The district court found that Angela Scarantino, Tri-
County's president, had little knowledge of the day-to-day 
business affairs of Tri-County.  Although the facts are disputed 
by Hartford, Scarantino was unable, for instance, to state 
whether Tri-County's financial statements were audited or un-
audited, or whether Tri-County could make a claim against Mele 
under the Bond, or how Tri-County billed Mele for the Viewmont 
job. 
 The district court also found that Mele had treated 
Bert Occulto, Tri-County's project manager and husband of one of 
the three Mele daughters, as a Mele employee.  More to the point, 
Mele enlisted him to participate in the negotiations between Mele 
and Hartford regarding the Bond. 
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 Local 542 members solicited Tri-County jobs at Mele's 
offices.  The court also found that John Mele had participated in 
Tri-County hiring, and greeted Stracham with the salutation, 
"glad to have you working for our company" when Stracham was 
seeking Tri-County employment.  The district court concluded that 
the only contact Local 542 members had with Tri-County was that 
they were paid with Tri-County checks. 
 When Mele was negotiating the Bond with Hartford, 
Hartford requested and received from Tri-County and the other 
family-owned corporations indemnification for any payments 
Hartford would have to make on the Bond.  The indemnity 
effectively precluded Tri-County itself from making a claim on 
the Bond.  Moreover, it made Tri-County liable for all debts for 
labor and materials incurred by Mele on the Viewmont project, 
regardless of whether the debt was owed to Tri-County or another 
company.  The district court described this agreement as a 
"financial albatross" which no "truly independent" corporation 
would assume.  Dist. Ct. Op. 13. 
 The district court also observed that Mele had 
unilaterally proposed to subordinate its $75,000.00 debt to Tri-
County to those of other creditors in its proposed plan of 
bankruptcy reorganization.  Tri-County has not objected to the 
subordination, nor has it made a claim in the Mele bankruptcy. 
 Finally, the court found that Hartford itself 
considered Mele and Tri-County as one company.  Dist. Ct. Op. 12. 
Hartford's internal correspondence referred to Tri-County as the 
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"union arm of Mele," and Hartford issued credit to Mele on the 
basis of composite Mele/Tri-County financial statements.   
 Hartford challenges a number of these factual findings 
as clear error, calling our attention to evidence which it 
contends the district court ignored, did not fully take into 
account, or evaluated incorrectly.  See Hartford's Brief at pp. 
19 et seq..  Hartford also emphasizes that corporate formalities 
were scrupulously maintained throughout Tri-County's 23 year 
existence, and that there is no evidence of commingling or 
siphoning of funds or transfers without adequate consideration. 
Under its separate name, Tri-County had been dealing amicably 
with Local 542 for over twenty years.  Further, Hartford notes 
that the two testifying union employees who supposedly had no 
contact with Tri-County beyond receiving their paychecks listed 
Tri-County, not Mele, as their employer on their unemployment 
claim forms.   Hartford also represented at oral argument that 
indemnities like the one given by Tri-County are commonplace in 
the construction industry. 
 We will not find clear error of fact unless a review of 
the record leaves us with the "definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made."  Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564, 573 (1985).  Although we are troubled by some aspects of the 
record, we are not persuaded by Hartford's argument.  Our 
independent review of the record does not convince us that the 
district court was mistaken or committed clear error in its 
factual determinations. 
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 The dissent, although acknowledging the findings made 
by the district court, assesses the evidence differently than did 
the district court, and also reads the record differently than do 
we.  The dissent concludes that, in its opinion, the district 
court was mistaken in its findings.  See Dissent Typescript at 4-
5, 11-13. 
 Despite the position taken by the dissent, we are bound 
to defer to the district court's factfinding if evidence supports 
those findings.  Under the clearly erroneous standard, a finding 
of fact may be reversed on appeal only "if it is completely 
devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational 
relationship to the supporting data."  Haines v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992).  When findings are based on 
determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) 
demands even greater deference to the trial court's findings. 
Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.  Thus, an appellate court may not 
substitute its findings for that of the district court, but is 
limited to making an assessment of whether there is enough 
evidence on record to support such findings.  Cooper v. Tard, 855 
F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 1988).  Here, there is more than 
sufficient credible evidence to sustain each and every finding 
made by the district court. 
 The district court judge heard the witnesses, assessed 
their credibility, and, on the basis of the credible evidence, 
made detailed findings to which we are obliged to defer.  Based 
on those historical findings, the district court found as 
ultimate facts that "the interrelationship between Mele and Tri-
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County was such that Mele controlled Tri-County," Dist. Ct. Op. 
11, and that Tri-County was "merely an extension of Mele and not 
a truly independent corporation . . . ."  Dist. Ct. Op. 17.  The 
district court consequently held, relying on the same legal 
authorities as does the dissent, that Tri-County was the alter 
ego of Mele. 
 These findings and this conclusion were reached after 
full recognition of the arguments on the evidence made by 
Hartford.  Giving the appropriate deference to the district 
court's findings mandates a holding that no mistake has been 
committed.  Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573. 
 True, if we, rather than the district court, were 
assigned the task of fact finding, we arguably might have found 
the facts differently.  But we are not charged with that task, 
and we are satisfied that there being no clear error of fact, 
and, as we explain below, no legal error, the district court's 
factual findings and its legal conclusion of alter ego should be 
upheld.  
 
B. 
 We also do not find that the district court committed 
legal error in holding Tri-County to be Mele's alter ego under 
Pennsylvania law.  In Ashley v. Ashley, 393 A.2d 637 (Pa. 1978), 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth, in a formula familiar 
to the courts of that state, the following principles which are 
to be applied when a trial court disregards corporate forms and, 
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"piercing the corporate veil," holds that one individual or 
corporation is the alter ego of another: 
Th[e] legal fiction of a separate corporate 
entity was designed to serve convenience and 
justice . . . and will be disregarded 
whenever justice or public policy demand and 
where rights of innocent parties are not 
prejudiced nor the theory of the corporate 
entity rendered useless. . ..  We have said 
that whenever one in control of a corporation 
uses that control, or uses the corporate 
assets, to further his or her own personal 
interests, the fiction of the separate 
corporate entity may properly be disregarded. 
Id. at 641 (citations omitted).  Pennsylvania courts have largely 
embraced the flexible tenor of the Ashley standard, holding, for 
instance, that no finding of fraud or illegality is required 
before the corporate veil may be pierced, but rather, that the 
corporate entity may be disregarded "whenever it is necessary to 
avoid injustice."  Rinck v. Rinck, 526 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 
1987).  Accord Lycoming County Nursing Home Ass'n, Inc. v. Com., 
Dept. of Labor and Industry, Prevailing Wage Appeal Bd., 627 A.2d 
238, 243-44 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1993).  We have said that Pennsylvania 
alter ego law requires a showing that the subordinate company 
"acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical response to the 
controller's tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons." 
Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 Despite the nominally separate formal existence of Tri-
County, the record to which we have referred supports the 
district court's findings and conclusion that Tri-County was 
Mele's alter ego.  We emphasize, as did the district court, that 
Tri-County was willing, at the request of John Mele and Hartford, 
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to indemnify Hartford for any obligations of Mele which might 
trigger Hartford's liability under the Bond.  This effectively 
merged the obligations of Tri-County and Mele, and prevented Tri-
County from making any claim under the Bond.  As a result, Tri-
County has not done so, even though Mele is indebted to it for 
over $75,000. 
   Although it may be true that an indemnity agreement, 
standing alone, is insufficient to establish alter ego status, 
see United States ex Rel. Global Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. WNH Ltd. 
Partnership, 995 F.2d 515, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1993), this fact 
alone cannot blunt the impact of Tri-County's general willingness 
to sacrifice its own interests for those of Mele.   This view is 
confirmed by Tri-County's failure to object to Mele's proposed 
plan in bankruptcy proceedings to subordinate Mele's debt to Tri-
County to that of all other creditors. 
 We agree with the district court that the record 
reveals a family enterprise divided into formal "divisions" but 
nonetheless controlled by the same people -- John Mele and his 
family -- and that Mele employed Tri-County to Mele's own 
business ends.  Tri-County relied entirely on Mele for its 
existence, both financially and operationally.  In function, Tri-
County was nothing more than the "personnel" arm of Mele.  In 
light of the district court's findings of undercapitalization, 
non-functioning of independent officers, non-payment of 
dividends, Tri-County's consequent insolvency, and the 
subordination of Tri-County's financial interests to those of 
Mele, all of which survive clear error scrutiny, we are satisfied 
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that Local 542 met its burden under Pennsylvania law of showing 
that "[Mele] wholly ignored the separate status of [Tri-County] 
and so dominated and controlled its affairs that its separate 
existence was a mere sham."  Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. 
Intersteel, Inc., 758 F.Supp. 1054, 1057 (W.D.Pa. 1990); accord 
Lycoming County Nursing Home, 627 A.2d at 243-44. 
 
C. 
 Hartford next argues that even if Tri-County and Mele 
are alter egos in the traditional sense, it was inequitable for 
the district court to hold Hartford liable to Local 542 under the 
Bond.  Hartford argues, in essence, that as it is a "third party" 
guarantor of Tri-County's obligations to Local 542, Hartford's 
bond cannot be reached.  We disagree. 
 This particular issue has arisen a number of times in 
connection with the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a et seq., and 
Pennsylvania courts have relied upon these Miller Act decisions 
in determining whether to pierce the corporate veil in non-Miller 
Act payment bond cases.  See Lezzer Cash & Carry, Inc. v. Aetna 
Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 857, appeal denied, 548 A.2d 256 (Pa.Super. 
1988). 
 The Miller Act (the "Act") requires prime contractors 
on any construction contract with the United States exceeding 
$25,000 to execute a bond "for the protection of all persons 
supplying labor and materials."  40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1986). 
The Act contains two important restrictions mirrored in many 
private payment bonds.  First, Like Hartford's Bond, a Miller Act 
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bond's coverage is limited to "first-tier" subcontractors (such 
as Tri-County) and those who contract with them (such as Local 
542).  J.W. Bateson Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Board of 
Trustees of Nat. Automatic Sprinkler Industry Pension Fund, 434 
U.S. 586, 594 (1978). 
 Second, § 270b(a) of the Act imposes a timely notice 
requirement essentially identical to that in Hartford's Bond, 
which requires those who contract with first-tier subcontractors, 
but not the first-tier subcontractors themselves, to give notice 
of their claims within 90 days after they last provided labor or 
materials. 
 These limitations have given rise to cases in which 
claimants on a payment bond seek to characterize the party with 
whom they contracted as the alter ego of a Miller Act contractor 
or subcontractor in order to avoid either the 90 day notice 
requirement or the coverage limitation of the Act.  See, e.g., 
Continental Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel. Conroe 
Creosoting Co., 308 F.2d 846, 848 (5th Cir. 1962) (claim on 
Miller Act bond permitted by supplier of sub-subcontractor when 
sub-subcontractor was merely a "shadow" of the subcontractor); 
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Newton Lumber & Mfg. Co., 388 F.2d 66 
(10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968)  (when 
claimants had negotiated primarily with subcontractor but 
contracted with a sub-subcontractor, the sub-subcontractor, whose 
principal was a relative of the president of the contractor, was 
held to be a "sham" and surety was therefore liable to them on 
the bond); National Surety Corporation v. Unites States ex rel. 
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Way Panama, S.A., 378 F.2d 294, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (5th 
Cir. 1967) (90 day notice provision not binding on plaintiff when 
contractor and subcontractor "operated essentially as one 
entity"); United States ex rel. Gilarde Environmental Management 
v. Federal Ins. Co., No. 89-1473, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17929 
(M.D.Pa. 1990) (same).0 
 The Fourth Circuit has held that Miller Act sureties 
may be reached "where ordinary principles of corporate law permit 
the courts to disregard corporate forms."  Global Building 
Supply, Inc. v. WNH Ltd. Partnership, 995 F.2d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 
1993).  The findings that we have upheld, and the conclusion to 
which they lead, have obliged us to hold that Mele and Tri-County 
were alter egos under ordinary principles of Pennsylvania law. It 
follows that Hartford may be held liable on the bond and, despite 
Hartford's argument, we are satisfied that the equities do not 
suggest a contrary result.   
                                                           
0This Court has declined to pierce the corporate veil when there 
was "no evidence of familial ties or of any other facts" 
suggesting that the contractor and subcontractor had considered 
their own contractual relations to be other than "serious and 
enforceable obligations."  United States ex rel. K & M Corp. v. A 
& M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979).  Gregos, which 
recognized the limitations on the right of remote sub-contractors 
to sue imposed by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Miller Act in J.W. Bateson Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586 (1978), also turned on a lack of 
evidence that the contractor had been motivated to limit its 
liability on the bond.  Id.  Here, different findings regarding 
alter ego have been made.  The district court found Mele and Tri-
County to be just one company, with strong family ties and with 
clear indicia of domination and control.  Moreover, it cannot be 
gainsaid that Hartford attempted to limit its liability on the 
Bond by seeking Tri-County's indemnification. 
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 Further, Tri-County's indemnity obviated the very 
purpose of the notice provision, which is to remove the risk that 
the surety would end up "double-compensating" both 
subcontractors, such as Tri-County, and their suppliers, such as 
Local 542.  See United States ex rel. Blue Circle West, Inc. v. 
Tuscon Mechanical Contracting Inc., 921 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1990). 
As the United States Supreme Court explained in J.W. Bateson Co., 
Inc. v. United States ex rel. Board of Trustees, 434 U.S. 586 
(1978), bond notice provisions function much like a statute of 
repose, "permit[ting] [the surety], after waiting ninety days, 
safely to pay [the] subcontractors without fear of additional 
liability to sub-subcontractors. . ..  The notice provision thus 
prevents both 'double payments' by [sureties] and the alternative 
of interminable delay in settlements between contractors and 
subcontractors."  Id. at 590-91 n.4 (citations omitted).  See 
also Lezzer, 537 A.2d at 862.  Because Tri-County itself could 
make no claim against Hartford, this risk was absent from the 
outset. 
 After having treated Mele and Tri-County as essentially 
the same company, Hartford cannot now assert Tri-County's 
independence as a means of avoiding liability.  The district 
court determined that the facts and the equities in this case 
required piercing the corporate veil and holding Mele to be Tri-
County's alter ego.  We agree.0 
                                                           
0The dissent claims that "[t]he relationship between Mele and 
Tri-County does not deprive Hartford of its status as an innocent 
third party."  Dissent Typescript at 9.  We are confident that 
our analysis, which relies on the Miller Act cases and which 
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IV.  ERISA Preemption 
 Hartford next contends that Local 542's action under 
the Bond is preempted by the Employees Retirement Income Security 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA").0  We must also reject this 
argument. 
A 
 With several exceptions not relevant here, § 514(a) of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), "preempts 'any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefits plan' covered by the statute." Mackey v. Lanier 
Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) 
(quoting § 514(a)). 
   We recently stated that a rule of law "relates to" an 
ERISA plan "if it is specifically designed to affect employee 
benefits plans, if it singles out such plans for special 
treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are 
predicated on the existence of such a plan."  United Wire, Metal 
and Machine Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial 
Hospital, 995 F.2d 1179, 1192 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. 
__, 114 S.Ct. 382 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
leads to Hartford's liability, would be followed by Pennsylvania 
courts. 
0We are not persuaded by Local 542's argument that Hartford 
failed to preserve its preemption claim for appeal because 
Hartford first raised the issue in its proposed findings of fact 
after all evidence had been adduced.  Accordingly, we address 
Hartford's preemption argument on the merits in text. 
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 In addition, state causes of action which conflict with 
ERISA § 502(a) (ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism) are also 
preempted.  Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 
(1987); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 
142 (1990).  
 Although neither party has briefed the issue, we assume 
that Local 542 is proceeding at common law as third-party 
beneficiary of the surety bond.  See Philadelphia v. Smith 
Roofing, 599 A.2d 222, 229 (Pa.Super. 1991). 
 At the outset, it is clear that the cause of action 
relied upon by Local 542 is neither "specifically designed to 
affect employee benefits plans" nor "singles out" such plans for 
special treatment.  United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.  Rather, such 
common law causes of action are "generally applicable" laws that 
"make[] no reference to, [and] indeed function[] irrespective of, 
the existence of an ERISA plan."  Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 
139.   
 Nor is the cause of action "predicated on the existence 
of" an ERISA plan.  United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1192.  In Ingersoll-
Rand the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted Texas' common 
law action against an employer for terminating an employee in 
order to avoid paying pension fund benefits.  One of the two 
reasons given by the Court for why the Texas action was preempted 
was that "in order to prevail [in the cause of action], a 
plaintiff [must] plead, and the court [must] find, that an ERISA 
plan exists and the employer had a pension-defeating motive in 
terminating the employment."  Id. at 140.  Such a cause of action 
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"relates not merely to pension benefits, but to the essence of 
the pension plan itself."  Id.  (emphasis in the original).  The 
Court concluded that "[b]ecause the court's inquiry must be 
directed to the plan, this judicially created cause of action 
'relate[s] to' an ERISA plan."  Id.   No such inquiry is 
necessary in the present action.   
 Here, the district court need only determine Hartford's 
obligations under the Bond.  It need make no inquiry into the 
validity or status of the funds (or indeed whether they are ERISA 
funds), nor need it explore Hartford's motives regarding employee 
benefits.  The fact that the claimant under the bond happens to 
be an ERISA fund is not the kind of "critical factor in 
establishing liability" that prompted preemption in Ingersoll-
Rand. Id. at 139-40.0 
                                                           
0For this reason, Hartford's reference to our decisions in 
Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen International Union Local 33 
Benefits Funds v. America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114 (3d 
Cir. 1991) and 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan v. Nobers, 968 F.2d 
401 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1066 
(1993) is inapposite.  Bricklayers held that ERISA preempted the 
New Jersey Construction Workers' Fringe benefit Security Act, 
N.J.STAT.ANN. § 34:11A-1--34:11A-12, which imposed certain 
obligations on prime contractors and owners of construction 
projects to assure payments owed by subcontractors-employers to 
ERISA-regulated fringe benefit funds.  The New Jersey statute 
challenged in Bricklayers  was "specifically designed to affect 
employee benefit plans," Bricklayers, 950 F.2d at 118 (quoting 
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 829 
(1988)), and, as such, was clearly within the preemption 
doctrine.  
 In Nobers, various plaintiffs brought a contract action 
seeking damages equivalent to what they would have received under 
an ERISA plan had they not been terminated under certain 
allegedly improper circumstances.  This Court determined, 
following Ingersoll-Rand, that the action was preempted because 
it "depend[ed] on the existence of an ERISA plan" and "if there 
were no plan, there would have been no cause of action."  Nobers, 
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 Our recent decision in Haberern v. Kaupp Vascual 
Surgeons Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1994) is 
instructive on this point.  Ms. Haberern's employer made 
contributions to her pension plan based on the size of her salary 
excluding bonus.  By re-characterizing a portion of her 
compensation as a "bonus," the employer effectively reduced the 
amount it paid into her pension plan.  Ms. Haberern claimed that 
this constituted a violation of ERISA.  The defendant argued that 
Ms. Haberern's status as an at-will employee under Pennsylvania 
law allowed it to change her compensation at any time.  Ms. 
Haberern responded that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania law on at-
will employment in this regard.  On appeal, we held that 
Pennsylvania's common law presumption of at-will employment 
relationships was not preempted by ERISA because the presumption 
was "unrelated to the existence vel non of any pension plan." Id. 
at 1497.  The very same may be said of Local 542's cause of 
action.  Simply because the sums collected may ultimately feed 
into an ERISA-governed fund does not in itself mean that the 
cause sued upon creates rights or restrictions which are 
"predicated on" the existence of an ERISA plan.0 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
968 F.2d at 406.  We find Nobers to be distinguishable.  The 
state contract action challenged in Nobers was predicated on the 
existence of benefits allegedly available to certain employees 
under the ERISA plans.  Thus, Nobers would have required "a 
plaintiff [to] plead, and the district court [to] find, that an 
ERISA plan exists" and that the plaintiffs would have been 
entitled to benefits under the plan, the very exercise which 
prompted preemption in Ingersoll-Rand, 998 U.S. at 140.  We need 
undertake no such exercise here. 
0Indeed, it should not be overlooked that the damages sought by 
Local 542 and ordered to be paid by Hartford include not just 
benefit funds, but union dues as well. 
27 
 
B 
 Nor is the cause of action asserted here subject to 
what we have termed "conflict preemption" under ERISA.  See PAS 
v. Travelers Insurance Company 7 F.3d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 1993). 
ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were meant to be exclusive. 
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51.  Thus, even a common law cause of 
action is preempted by ERISA if it conflicts directly with an 
ERISA cause of action.  See Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142. 
 Together, ERISA §§ 502 and 515 (29 U.S.C. §§ 1132 
and 1145, respectively) "provide a cause of action and remedies 
for an employer's failure to fulfill its obligations to make 
pension or welfare fund contributions pursuant to a plan or 
collective bargaining agreement." Bricklayers and Allied 
Craftsmen International Union Local 33 Benefits Funds v. 
America's Marble Source, Inc., 950 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
 Section 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5), defines 
"employer" as "any person acting directly as an employer, or 
indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an 
employee benefit plan."  Courts that have considered the matter 
have all but unanimously held that sureties do not fall within 
this definition. See, e.g., Carpenters So. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. D 
& L Camp Construction Co., Inc., 738 F.2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 
1984) (legislative history of ERISA revealed no Congressional 
intent to "expand the concept of employer . . . to include 
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sureties, whose obligations are fixed by contract and regulated 
by state law for the protection of the public"). 
 The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that sureties who 
are not signatories to the collective bargaining agreement 
between the employer and the claimants do not fall within the 
ERISA definition of "employer," stating as follows: 
The phrase, "in the interests of the 
employer" is the operative one here.  The 
surety does not act indirectly in the 
interests of the employer, but rather acts 
directly in the interests of employees 
damaged by the employer's failure to pay. 
Xaros v. U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1180 
(11th Cir. 1987); cf. Laborers Local 938 Joint Health & Welfare 
Trust Fund v. B.R. Starnes Co., 827 F.2d 1454, 1457 (11th Cir. 
1987); Giardiello v. Balboa Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 
1988).  But see Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 818 
F.Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the reasoning of the 
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits and holding that a surety qualified 
as an employer under ERISA). 
 We agree with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits that a 
surety does not act "in the interest of an employer."  Although 
it is true that the surety's services are often purchased by the 
employer in order that it may proceed with its business, the 
ultimate beneficiaries of that contract are the claimants on the 
bond.  The surety does not stand in an employer relationship to 
the claimants, nor is it the agent of the employer.  Thus, 
Hartford, which is neither the employer of Local 542's operating 
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engineers nor acting "in the interests of" their employer, cannot 
claim ERISA preemption. 
 
V. Damages 
 Hartford's final argument on appeal concerns the extent 
of its liability under the Bond.  The district court awarded 
Local 542 a total of $126,224.11, including $78,794.79 in unpaid 
contributions, $5,719.11 in union dues and $42,190.21 in 
liquidated damages, all derived from the provisions of the CBA 
(Collective Bargaining Agreement) less $480.00 in prepayment.0 
The court also awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs of 
$19,881.73 according to the terms of the PFA (Pension Fund 
Agreement).0  Hartford contends that under Pennsylvania law its 
obligations do not extend to payment of liquidated damages and 
                                                           
0Article VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement requires the 
employer (Tri-County) to make timely fringe benefit contributions 
to the Funds of "26.6% of wages" divided up among the various 
funds, as well as a Union Check-Off equalling 3.2% of wages.  
Section seven of Article VI provides for a surcharge of 20% per 
annum or 2% above prime rate, whichever is higher, on certain 
late contributions.  App. 25.  
0Article VIII, section 1 of the pension fund trust agreement 
between the union and the employer provides that: 
 
The Board of Trustees . . . shall have the 
right . . . to institute and prosecute . . . 
any proceeding at law . . . against any 
Employer . . . to collect unpaid 
contributions which may be or become due 
under this Agreement . . ..  Such Employer 
shall pay all costs and reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred by the Board of Trustees in 
connection with any such litigation. 
 
App. 133 (emphasis added) 
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attorney fees in the absence of a specific bond provision to the 
contrary.  We agree.  
 Pennsylvania law, at least as announced by that State's 
intermediate courts, limits a surety's obligations to those 
detailed in the bond itself, Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Ernest 
Renda Contracting Co., Inc., 454 A.2d 39, 45 (Pa.Super. 1982), 
and not those contained in the agreement between the contractor 
and the claimant.  J.C. Snavely & Sons, Inc. v. Web M & E, Inc., 
594 A.2d 333, 336 (Pa.Super. 1991).  Local 542's claims against 
Hartford are predicated, at least in part, on Tri-County's 
obligations to it under the CBA and the PFA.  Because the Bond 
makes no reference to liquidated damages or attorney fees, 
Hartford has disavowed any responsibility for these items. 
Hartford's bond provides as follows: 
[Hartford agrees] that every claimant . . . 
who has not been paid in full before the 
expiration of a period of ninety (90) days 
after the date on which the last of such 
claimant's work or labor was done or 
performed . . . may sue on this bond for 
. . . such sum or sums as may be justly due 
claimant. . .. 
App. 97.  Hartford is thus obliged to render to Local 542 all 
sums which Local 542 is "justly due" for labor.  The district 
court reasoned that as Local 542 members would not be "paid in 
full" for their labor until all of Tri-County's obligations under 
the CBA and PFA (including liquidated damages and attorney fees) 
had been satisfied, Hartford must be liable for these items. 
Although the parties have pointed us to no decisions of the 
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court treating the issues presented here, we 
believe that the law of Pennsylvania is otherwise. 
 As previously noted, the bond is silent as to attorney 
fees and liquidated damages, and it is the language of the bond 
that is controlling under Pennsylvania law.  Thus, the central 
question necessarily becomes:  What obligations are "sums justly 
due" for labor?  One answer is that the surety's obligations to 
the claimant are co-extensive with those of the employer.  But 
this is simply to say that Hartford's obligations are fully 
determined by the agreements between Tri-County and Local 542. As 
already noted, this has been expressly (and recently) rejected by 
Pennsylvania's lower courts.  Such decisions are persuasive 
precedent, National Surety Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 29 
(3d Cir. 1977), and are "not to be disregarded by a federal court 
unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest 
court of the state would decide otherwise."  West v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).0 
                                                           
0The district court considered the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the Miller Act in United States for the Benefit of Sherman, et 
al. v. Carter, et al., 353 U.S. 210 (1957) to be just such 
"persuasive data."  The Miller Act requires contractors on public 
works projects to post a bond covering the "sum or sums justly 
due" suppliers of material and labor.  See 40 U.S.C. 
§ 270a(a)(2).  Carter held that "sums justly due" under the 
Miller Act included not only delinquent contributions to fringe 
benefits funds, but also liquidated damages and attorney fees.  
 We are not convinced that Carter is apposite in the 
present case.  First, the Miller Act imposes policy-driven 
statutory obligations on the principal and surety which are not 
implicated here.  Second, this Court implicitly rejected this 
view in Knecht, Inc. v. United Pacific Insurance Company, 860 
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1988), which concluded that under Pennsylvania 
law attorney fees are not "sums justly due" under a payment bond. 
Id. at  80-81.  Further, in Carter the parties had expressly 
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 Nevertheless, it is clear that what Local 542 is 
"justly due" turns at least in part on what Tri-County promised 
Local 542.  And this will inevitably be determined by reference 
to the agreements between them.  Indeed, Hartford does not 
contest that Local 542 is "justly due" the fringe benefit 
contributions and union dues which are specified in detail in the 
CBA.  The question thus becomes what of Tri-County's obligations 
to Local 542 are "sums justly due" for labor. 
 In regard to attorney fees, we have already held that 
they are not "sums justly due."  In doing so, we rejected an 
argument very much like that proffered by Local 542 and accepted 
by the district court.  In Knecht, Inc. v. United Pacific 
Insurance Company, 860 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1988), a supplier brought 
suit on a surety bond covering "sums justly due," seeking, inter 
alia, attorney fees.  We stated as follows: 
The district judge noted that unless the 
[attorney] fees were paid, [the claimant] 
would not be made whole.  This undoubtedly is 
correct but the judge's holding proved too 
much, as it is always true that when a 
plaintiff must make expenditures for 
attorney's fees to recover a debt it will not 
be made whole unless its fees are also 
recovered.  Further, whenever a person is 
indebted to another the sum owed may be 
regarded as justly due. . . . In fact, we can 
hardly conceive of how a bond could be 
written to authorize a claimant to sue for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stipulated that liquidated damages and attorney fees were 
compensation for labor.  353 U.S. at 220.  Finally, whether 
Carter can stand for the broader proposition that such sums are 
always "justly due" must be questioned in the aftermath of F. D. 
Rich Co., Inc. v. United States, 417 U.S. 116 (1974), which held 
that an award of attorney fees under the Miller Act would in 
ordinary circumstances be an inappropriate abrogation of the 
American rule.  Id. at 130-31. 
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anything less than a sum justly due.  We also 
observe that in some contracts express 
provision is made for recovery of attorney's 
fees in the event of an action for breach. 
Yet in [the bond] no reference was made to 
attorney's fees.  In the circumstances, we 
conclude that attorney's fees are not 
recoverable in this action.  
Id. at 80-81.  Since Knecht, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has 
held that attorney fees are not sums "justly due."  Snavely, 594 
A.2d at 334-37.   As we are unable to discern a meaningful 
difference between the present action and the cause of action 
asserted in Knecht, we are constrained to reverse the district 
court's award of attorney fees. 
 We must similarly reverse the district court's award of 
"liquidated damages," a sum which the CBA refers to as a 
"penalty" to be assessed against Tri-County in the event of late 
payment of the fringe benefit contributions.0   On at least three 
occasions Pennsylvania courts (or courts applying Pennsylvania 
law) have rejected the liability of a surety for default 
obligations which add some percentage accretion to the underlying 
debt.  See Reliance Universal, Inc. of Ohio v. Ernest Renda 
                                                           
0Section seven of Article VI of the CBA, entitled "Penalty 
Clause," provides as follows: 
 
All Fringe Benefits Funds.  [P]ayments are 
due . . . not later than the 25th of the 
month . . ..  In the event [of a delinquency 
continuing until] the 15th of the next 
succeeding month, there will be due . . . a 
penalty in the amount of twenty percent (20%) 
per annum or 2% above the prime rate, 
whichever is higher, of the original 
contributions which will be assessed until 
the delinquency . . . [is] resolved. 
 
App. 25. 
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Contracting Co., 454 A.2d 39, 44-46 (Pa.Super. 1982) (surety on 
bond covering cost of "all labor and material used" not liable 
for a 1 1/2% "service charge" for late accounts provided for in 
contract between contractor and supplier because not part of the 
"cost" of labor and materials); Lite-Air Products, Inc. v. 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 437 F.Supp. 801, 804 (E.D.Pa. 
1977) (surety on bond covering "amount due the claimant for such 
labor or material" not liable for "finance charges" on late 
payments for materials because such charges are more akin to 
penalties or damages than they are related to the value of the 
materials); J.C. Snavely & Sons, 594 A.2d at 335-37 (surety on 
bond covering "sums as may be justly due" not liable for attorney 
fees and finance charges accrued under agreement between claimant 
and contractor because not detailed in the payment bond).  See 
also Salvino Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Fletcher & Sons, Inc., 
580 A.2d 853, 856 (Pa.Super. 1990) (surety on bond covering 
payment to those who have "furnished material or performed or 
supplied labor" not liable for delay damages attributable to 
contractor because not within the express language of the bond).0 
 These cases reveal a clear reluctance on the part of 
Pennsylvania courts to expand the liability of a surety beyond 
the base or essential obligations of the contractor.  Indeed, in 
Lite-Air the court declined to hold a surety liable for "finance 
charges" for delinquent payments as they were in the nature of a 
                                                           
0The district court distinguished many of the above-cited cases 
on the ground that they involved suppliers of material, not 
labor.  We are not persuaded by this distinction. 
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penalty -- and "penalty" is precisely how the "liquidated 
damages" are described in the CBA.  In the absence of an express 
provision in the Bond, we conclude that such additional 
contractual "charges," "fees" or "penalties" cannot be considered 
"sums justly due" and hence are not recoverable from a surety 
under Pennsylvania law.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
district court on this ground as well. 
 
 
VI. 
 Having considered the record and the arguments of the 
parties, we will affirm the district court's March 2, 1994 and 
February 15, 1995 orders insofar as they entered judgment on 
Count IV against Hartford and in favor of Local 542 for unpaid 
contributions and union dues, less prepayments.   
 We will, however, reverse the district court's orders 
insofar as they grant liquidated damages and attorney fees to 
Local 542, and we will remand to the district court with 
directions that the March 2, 1994 order and the February 15, 1995 
judgment be modified to delete all amounts awarded to Local 542 
for liquidated damages and attorney fees, consistent with the 
foregoing opinion. 
 
Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating, Inc. et al. 
Nos. 94-1388 & 95-1189 
HUTCHINSON, J., Dissenting. 
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 I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to 
affirm the district court's March 2, 1994 order.  In my view, the 
district court erred as a matter of law in piercing the corporate 
veil.  This case does not involve exceptional circumstances, nor 
demand the use of this extraordinary remedy to impose liability 
on Hartford, an independent third-party surety.  Moreover, the 
district court's factual findings leave me with a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake was committed.  In my opinion, the 
Court embraces, contrary to applicable Pennsylvania law, an 
overly broad view of the doctrine that permits a court to pierce 
the corporate veil in extraordinary cases to prevent fraud or 
injustice.  In addition, I believe the Court's holding is likely 
to unsettle the reasonable expectations of parties who secure 
bonds for the payment of materialmen and suppliers (as well as 
others) in construction projects and reduce competition in the 
industry.0 
 Local 542 concedes that it did not give Hartford ninety 
days notice of its claims in accord with the bond terms. 
Pennsylvania law requires compliance with this type of notice 
provision as a condition precedent to recovery on a payment bond. 
See Lezzer Cash & Carry, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 857, 
865 (Pa. Super.) ("The notice provision at issue here stated 
specifically that written notice within the ninety day period was 
a condition precedent to Aetna's liability on the bond.  We are 
                                                           
0I agree with the Court that Pennsylvania law, not ERISA, governs 
this case.  I also concur with the Court's conclusion that 
Hartford could not be liable for counsel fees or liquidated 
damages. 
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obliged to enforce the terms of the agreement."), appeal denied, 
548 A.2d 256 (Pa. 1988).  Therefore, Local 542 cannot recover 
against Hartford unless it can prevail under an alter ego theory. 
 Pennsylvania law is unclear as to whether the finding 
of alter ego is a question of fact or law.  I am not insensitive 
to this Court's statement, applying federal law, that "[a] 
finding of an alter ego situation is a factual one and must be 
supported by the record."0  Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. 
Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(citation omitted).  More recently, however, we stated: 
 Assuming that Pennsylvania will permit 
recovery on an alter-ego theory on a showing 
of injustice, as opposed to fraud or deceit 
(a point not yet decided by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court), it is nevertheless plain that 
Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, does not allow 
recovery unless the party seeking to pierce 
the corporate veil on an alter-ego theory 
establishes that the controlling corporation 
wholly ignored the separate status of the 
controlled corporation and so dominated and 
controlled its affairs that its separate 
existence was a mere sham.  See In re Penn 
Cent. Sec. Litig., 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1035 
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Ashley v. Ashley, 482 Pa. 
228, 236-238, 393 A.2d 637, 641 (1978).  In 
other words, both Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
require a threshold showing that the 
controlled corporation acted robot- or 
puppet-like in mechanical response to the 
controller's tugs on its strings or pressure 
on its buttons. 
 
 
Culbreth v. Amosa Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam); see also Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 
                                                           
0This statement, arguably dictum, can be read as standing for no 
more than the obvious proposition that every legal conclusion 
must have factual support. 
38 
F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1988).  The Culbreth standard has been 
followed by several district courts.  See Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc. 
v. Jiffy Lube of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp 569, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1994); 
May v. Club Med Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 937, 938-39 (E.D. Pa. 
1993); Stinson v. GAF Corp., 757 F. Supp. 644, 645-46 (W.D. Pa. 
1990).  This suggests to me that the alter ego determination 
involves elements of law as well as fact. 
 In any event, the treatment of two companies as alter 
egos is "an extraordinary remedy preserved for cases involving 
exceptional circumstances."  Village at Camelback Property Owners 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Carr, 538 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 1988), aff'd 
per curiam, 572 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1990); see also First Realvest, Inc. 
v. Avery Builders, Inc., 600 A.2d 601, 604 (Pa. Super. 1991) 
(characterizing the alter ego remedy as "extreme"); Connors v. 
Peles, 724 F. Supp. 1538, 1559 (W.D. Pa. 1989) ("The decision of 
a court to pierce the corporate veil . . . is to be exercised 
reluctantly and cautiously.").  A party attempting to negate the 
separate existence of a corporate entity has the burden of 
presenting "clear, direct, precise and believable evidence that 
the corporate veil should be pierced."  Iron Worker's Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. IWS, Inc., 622 A.2d 367, 376 (Pa. Super. 1993); see also 
First Realvest, 600 A.2d at 604 (party failed to state sufficient 
facts to support alter ego theory); Carpenters Health, 727 F.2d 
at 284 (burden of proof rests on party attempting to pierce the 
corporate veil). 
 Pennsylvania law considers a variety of factors to 
determine whether one corporation is the alter ego of another. 
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They include the ignoring of corporate formalities, gross 
undercapitalization, a lack of corporate records, non-functioning 
officers and directors, non-arms-length transactions between the 
corporations, and especially domination and day-to-day control 
sufficient to deprive the alter ego of its corporate identity. 
See Village at Camelback, 538 A.2d at 533; see also Carpenters 
Health, 727 F.2d at 284; United States v. Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 88 
(3d Cir. 1981).  Before concluding a corporation is the alter ego 
of another, the trial court must be able to conclude, based upon 
the record, that justice or public policy demands the use of such 
an extraordinary remedy, that the rights of innocent parties will 
not be prejudiced, and that the theory of the corporate entity 
will not be rendered useless.  Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 
861 (quoting Ashley, 393 A.2d at 641).  Absent extraordinary or 
unusual circumstances, a court should recognize and maintain the 
separate corporate identity.  First Realvest, 600 A.2d at 604; 
Reverse Vending Assoc. v. Tomra Systems US, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 
1122, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
 In determining whether Tri-County was Mele's alter ego, 
the district court expressly found that Tri-County consistently 
complied with all corporate formalities.  Despite this finding, 
however, it then went on to conclude that the two corporations 
were alter egos.  It found:  (1) Tri-County only worked on Mele 
projects; (2) Tri-County was grossly undercapitalized; (3) 
Hartford treated Tri-County and Mele as one company; (4) Tri-
County's president, who was the daughter of Mele's owner, lacked 
knowledge of the company's business; (5) Mele assisted in hiring 
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Tri-County employees; (6) Tri-County had never paid dividends; 
(7) Tri-County's employees only contact with Tri-County was its 
name on their paychecks; (8) the two companies' employees were 
interchanged; and (9) Mele proposed to subordinate all of its 
debt to Tri-County in bankruptcy proceedings without Tri-County's 
knowledge or authorization.  Ragan v. Tri-County Excavating, 
Inc., No. 92-0066, slip op. at 4-7, 15 (E.D. Pa. March 2, 1994). 
 I believe the district court's findings are 
insufficient to support an alter ego theory.  Put simply, Local 
542 failed to meet its threshold burden of showing that Mele 
"wholly ignored the separate status of [Tri-County] and so 
dominated and controlled its affairs that its separate existence 
was a mere sham."  Culbreth, 898 F.2d at 14.  Nor did Local 542 
show that Tri-County "acted robot- or puppet-like in mechanical 
response to [Mele's] tugs on its strings or pressure on its 
buttons."  Id. at 15.  In my opinion, the present circumstances 
are not so "exceptional" or "unusual" as to warrant extension of 
this extraordinary remedy to force Hartford to pay debts it did 
not agree to cover.  See Village at Camelback, 538 A.2d at 533; 
First Realvest, 600 A.2d at 604; Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 
861. 
 I also believe the Court's statement that "no finding 
of fraud or illegality is required before the corporate veil may 
be pierced, but rather, that the corporate entity may be 
disregarded 'whenever it is necessary to avoid injustice,'" 
Majority Op. at 16 (quoting Rinck v. Rinck, 526 A.2d 1221, 1223 
(Pa. Super. 1987)), is an incorrect statement of Pennsylvania 
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law.  The Court in Culbreth did assume that Pennsylvania would 
pierce the corporate veil upon a showing of injustice but, 
nevertheless, concluded that a party had to make a threshold 
showing that the subordinate company was completely controlled 
and dominated or "acted robot- or puppet-like."  Culbreth, 898 
F.2d at 14-15.  I do not think Local 542 has so shown.  Neither 
Rinck nor Culbreth involved an attempt to impose liability on a 
third-party through the third-party's dealings with an alter ego. 
Though an "injustice" standard is more flexible than a standard 
of "fraud," nevertheless, when the corporate veil is pierced 
under either standard, the knife is usually pointed at the 
shareholder who stands behind the veil, not those who contract 
with the shareholder's alter ego. 
 In reaching its conclusion, I believe the district 
court was improperly induced to make Hartford a full participant 
in the activities of Mele and Tri-County by its fixation on the 
fact that Local 542 was attempting to recover money for pension 
and other benefit plans.  During the hearing, for instance, the 
district court stated that "nothing is more sacred today in this 
country than a pension plan because it's been ignored by too many 
people and that's important."  Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at 
585.  It also stated that "[t]o preclude recovery on their claim 
would have a serious impact on their pensions and health and 
other benefits."  Ragan, No. 92-0066, slip op. at 16.  Though 
workers' pension rights are important, I think the district 
court's decision placed too much emphasis on the persons in whose 
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behalf Local 542 sued.  The pension problem should have been left 
to ERISA, which we all agree does not apply here.0 
 In addition to finding exceptional circumstances where 
none exist, I believe the district court committed legal error by 
utilizing the alter ego theory to impose liability on an innocent 
third-party (Hartford).  Ordinarily, courts apply the alter ego 
theory to impose liability upon a shareholder who manipulates its 
so-called alter ego.  These cases present issues of corporate 
governance.  The district court, however, made no distinction 
between the issue of corporate governance and the issue of 
contract and surety law, which controls this case.  Instead, it 
simply treated this matter as one involving the alter ego 
doctrine and then used that doctrine to change the text of a 
contract between Hartford and Mele.  It allowed Local 542 to 
pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on Hartford, a 
third-party contracting with Mele in the ordinary course of its 
business as a surety, rather than on Mele, the manipulative 
corporate shareholder who is responsible for the injustice, if 
any, that may be present here. 
 In doing so, it failed adequately to consider 
Pennsyvlania's general rule against piercing the corporate veil 
to the prejudice of innocent parties.  See Ashley, 393 A.2d at 
641; Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 861.  In Lezzer Cash & 
                                                           
0The ERISA issues seem to have dropped out of the case when Tri-
County conceded its liability for the pension payments due 
Local 542. 
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Carry, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed a fact 
pattern similar to this one.  It stated: 
[T]here is no need to pierce the corporate 
veil in order to avoid injustice.  As to the 
corporate enterprises of SGA [principal and 
general contractor] and Oreland 
[subcontractor], whatever their relationship 
may be, both Aetna [surety] and Lezzer 
[materialman] are not involved.  On the 
contrary, both are innocent parties.  Aetna 
issued a payment bond as requested by SGA and 
included therein terms which were 
satisfactory to SGA, the principal, and PHP, 
the obligee.  Lezzer entered a contract to 
sell materials to Independence [sub-
subcontractor], with whom it had been doing 
business on prior occasions.  It did so with 
knowledge of or the ability to learn the 
terms of the payment bond which had been 
issued by Aetna.  As between Aetna and 
Lezzer, both innocent parties, there was no 
reason to pierce the corporate veils of SGA 
and Oreland in order to alter the terms of 
the bond which Aetna had agreed to write to 
protect designated subcontractors and 
materialmen. 
 
 
Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 861. 
 In determining that Hartford was not innocent because 
it "considered Mele and Tri-County as one company,"  Ragan, No. 
92-0066, slip op. at 12, 16, the district court relied upon Tri-
County's indemnity agreement, an internal memorandum from 
Hartford that referred to Tri-County as part of Mele, and 
Hartford's review of Tri-County's financial statements.  In my 
view, this is insufficient to support a finding that Hartford was 
not an innocent third-party.  See James E. McFadden, Inc. v. 
Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa. 1985) 
(inter-office memoranda largely irrelevant to alter ego issue); 
44 
Global Building Supply, Inc. v. WNH Ltd. Partnership, 995 F.2d 
515 (4th Cir. 1993) (name association insufficient to find one 
company is alter ego of other).  As with the surety in Lezzer 
Cash & Carry, Hartford issued a payment bond containing terms 
agreeable to Mele, not Local 542.  The relationship between Mele 
and Tri-County does not deprive Hartford of its status as an 
innocent third-party. 
 In this respect, I recognize Pennsylvania's tendency to 
look to federal cases interpreting the Miller Act as persuasive 
authority, and I have no quarrel with the principle that 
"sureties may be reached 'where ordinary principles of corporate 
law permit the courts to disregard corporate forms.'"  Majority 
Op. at 21 (quoting Global Building Supply, Inc., 995 F.2d at 
519).  However, in Pennsylvania, "ordinary principles of 
corporate law" seem to me to preclude use of alter ego doctrine 
to impose liability on innocent third-parties.  See Ashley, 393 
A.2d at 641; Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 861.  In 
particular, I do not find persuasive those Miller Act cases that 
pre-date Ashley and Lezzer Cash & Carry.  See Global Building 
Supply, 995 F.2d at 519 (describing pre-Bateson cases as 
"arguably" more prove to excuse non-compliance with a bond's 
notice provision than those that came after Bateson). 
 Additionally, I am unable to accept the Court's 
conclusion that Hartford (as a third-party surety) can be 
compelled to pay because the party "in control of a corporation 
uses that control, or uses the corporate assets, to further his 
or her own personal interests. . . ."  Majority Op. at 16 
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(quoting Ashley, 393 A.2d at 641).  Such a general statement 
strikes me as obiter dictum.  At best, it is a truism.  At worst, 
if taken seriously, it would permit courts to ignore the fiction 
of separate corporate existence at will.  That fiction is one of 
proven utility and, in my judgment, essential to the functioning 
of a modern free market industrial society. 
 Finally, I believe the district court not only erred as 
a matter of law, but that its ultimate finding that Mele and Tri-
County were alter egos is clearly erroneous.  Put somewhat 
differently, viewing the record as a whole leads me to a 
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal 
quote omitted). 
 Specifically, Tri-County followed all corporate 
formalities and maintained a legitimate set of corporate records. 
Although Mele may have participated in Tri-County's management, 
there is no clear indication that John Mele or his corporation 
dominated and controlled Tri-County to such an extent that it was 
a facade or a sham.  See McFadden, 609 F. Supp. at 1105 (mere 
participation in management is insufficient).  Further, neither 
John Mele nor his corporation owned any stock in Tri-County; nor 
can the court attribute a financial interest to John Mele and the 
Mele corporation simply because his three daughters were Tri-
County's sole shareholders.  Related family corporations often 
have common stockholders. 
 The fact the district court seemed to rely upon most 
strongly was the indemnity agreement Hartford demanded from Tri-
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County and the Mele family's other corporations.  The record 
indicates, though, that Tri-County and its owners reasonably 
thought they would benefit financially if Mele obtained bonding 
and performed the project.  Thus, I conclude the indemnity 
agreement is insufficient to justify the conclusion that Tri-
County was Mele's alter ego. 
 The district court also relied on testimony that some 
of Tri-County's employees were interviewed and hired at Mele's 
offices.  The record, however, also shows that these interviews 
were done by a Tri-County employee, who made the decision to 
hire.  Moreover, the testimony to the effect that it was common 
knowledge that Tri-County and Mele were the same company can just 
as easily be taken as showing that Local 542 dealt with Tri-
County with its eyes open.  See Lezzer Cash & Carry, 537 A.2d at 
861.  The fact that a Tri-County employee attended a meeting with 
Hartford concerning the surety bond does not appear unusual to me 
as Hartford was asking Tri-County to indemnify it. 
 I recognize, of course, that Tri-County's president's 
responses to the district court could indicate that she lacked 
any detailed knowledge of Tri-County's operations.  The district 
court used these responses to conclude that the president was a 
mere figurehead.  Many times, however, her answers merely 
indicated confusion over the nature of the question and the 
district court's manner in asking it. 
 The district court believed that Tri-County's ignorance 
of Mele's proposal to subordinate Tri-County's debt in its 
bankruptcy proceeding was significant.  I fail to see how a 
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"unilateral" offer by Mele to subordinate its debt to Tri-County, 
without Tri-County's knowledge, is evidence of Tri-County's 
participation in abuse of the corporate form warranting 
application of the alter ego doctrine. 
 The district court's conclusion that Tri-County only 
worked on projects with Mele is not borne out by the record.  The 
district court's belief that Tri-County was grossly 
undercapitalized ignores the economic reality that it had 
operated successfully for twenty-three years.  So, too, Tri-
County's failure to pay dividends strikes me as nothing unusual 
for family corporations whose owners are acquainted with our 
income tax laws. 
 On the other hand, the undisputed fact that there was 
no commingling of funds and Tri-County was not recently 
incorporated indicate, along with their observance of corporate 
formalities, that the separate corporate existence of Mele and 
Tri-County should not be ignored.  Taking all these facts 
together, I am unable to conclude that Local 542 produced 
evidence that is clear, precise and convincing enough to warrant 
piercing the corporate veil. 
 Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's 
judgment in all respects. 
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